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Faculty: Montana Legislative Summary, 1959

Montana Legislature Summary, 1959
This article is intended to summarize the more significant legislation
passed by the 1959 Montana Legislative Assembly. The following sections
have been written by the Law School faculty, based on bills selected by the
Law Review staff and Advisor. Not all of the legislation enacted has been
commented on, but the bills believed to be the most important permanent
laws have been included. Appropriation bills and other similarly temporary
legislation have not generally been noted. Statutes noted are identified
both by the chapter of the 1959 session laws and by their House or Senate
bill numbers.
The new enactments are discussed under the following major headings:
CIVIL PROCEDURE
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS
CORPORATIONS
CRIMINAL LAW
CRIMINAL LAW
ADMINISTRATION
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
FISH AND GAME
HIGHWAYS
INSURANCE
THE JUDICIARY
LABOR LAW

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
PERPETUITIES; PENSION &
PROFIT-SHARING PLANS
PERSONAL PROPERTY
PUBLIC HEALTH
SCHOOLS
STAVE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT
TAXATION
TORTS
UNIFORM AND MODEL LAWS
WILLS
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

CIVIL PROCEDURE
New Rules
The first step was taken toward the adoption in Montana of rules of
civil procedure patterned after the FederalRules. The legislation contains a
rather curious blending of legislative power with the rule making power of
the Supreme Court of Montana.
Chapter 132 (Sen. Sub. for H.B. 31) provides that the Supreme Court
shall appoint a Commission of eleven persons, who are to serve without compensation, to study and prepare Rules of Civil Procedure for the State of
Montana: The Commission is to be composed of the Chief Justice of Montana, or an Associate Justice designated by the Chief Justice; three judges
from the district courts of the state, one of whom must be President of the
Montana Judges' Association and the others from a list of judges suggested
by the Judges' Association; seven lawyers, one of whom must be President
of the Montana Bar Association and the others from a list submitted by the
President of the Montana Bar Association. Five of the lawyers must be
members of the Montana Bar Association, and all lawyers designated
must be actively practicing law in Montana or members of the faculty of
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the Law School of Montana State University. The Supreme Court is given
power to provide for terms of office and changes in the personnel of the
Commission.'
Proposed rules prepared by the Commission are to be distributed to
the bench and bar of the state for their consideration and suggestions.
Within six months thereafter a final tentative draft must be submitted to
the Supreme Court for its approval, and the court must give notice of
hearing by mailing to all district judges and attorneys licensed to practice
in the Montana courts. The hearing, at which all interested persons and
organizations may appear, must be held within ninety days after submission by the Commission.
Approval by the Supreme Court, according to the legislation, is not
sufficient. Any rules promulgated only become effective upon adoption
by the legislature.
The bill provides for the employment by the Commission of secretarial help and research assistance, and that members of the Commission
shall be reimbursed for actual travel and other expenses incurred in the
discharge of their duties, including attendance at meetings. However.
the appropriation of $8,500 which was provided in the bill as introduced
was stricken and a separate appropriation of $3,000 was made.' The
inadequacy of this appropriation is reflected in the following extract from
the Order of the Supreme Court:
It further appearing that the amount appropriated by the legislature for the work of the Commission may be necessary for printing and distributing copies of the suggested rules and by reason
thereof the Commissioners shall serve without reimbursement for
travel or other expenses incurred in the discharge of their duties,
including attendance at meetings until the further order of the
court.
If the purpose of the proposed legislation is accomplished, Montana
will join the trend which has resulted in approximately one-third of the
states adopting rules patterned after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Stay Bonds
The provision of the statute with respect to stay bonds on appeals
from judgments or orders directing the payment of money' has been
amended. Under chapter 75 (H.B. 198) the undertaking will no longer have
to be in double the amount named in the judgment or order. Rather the
undertaking must be in the amount of the judgment or order, plus interest
at the legal rate for two years, and estimated costs on appeal, in an
amount to be fixed by the trial court.
'The Supreme Court has appointed the following persons as members of the Commission, each for a term of two years from May 1, 1959: Hon. James T. Harrison,
Hon. Philip C. Duncan, Hon. Lester H. Loble, Hon. Guy C. Derry, Franklin S.
Longan, Esq., Cale J. Crowley, Esq., Gene A. Plcotte, Esq., A. G. Shone, Esq.
2H.B. 528.
'R.C.M. 1947, § 93-8007.
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Attendance of Witnesses

Chapter 154 (S.B. 117) repeals the statute' which provides that a
witness may not be compelled to attend a trial if he resides in a county
other than that where a trial is had and more than 100 miles from where
it takes place.
Terms of Court
Chapter 144 (H.B. 259) amends the statutes' with respect to terms of
district court to give greater flexibility and authority to the court. The
amendments do away with the requirement that sessions of court be held
at the county seat. The provision that juries "must be called on the first
Monday of every alternate month, if the judge so directs, and oftener if
the public business requires," has been replaced by the simple provision
that they must be called "by the judge as often as the public business
requires." Orders fixing the times at which terms are to be held in districts where two or more counties are united are required to be filed in
the office of the clerk of the district court in each county, but the present
requirement of publication of such orders is eliminated. The amendments
also eliminate the requirement that such orders be made within ten days
after the first day of December each year to remain in effect without
change for the next year. The amendments do not prescribe when such
orders shall be made and merely provide that they shall remain in effect
until further order of the judge. Further under the amendments, in districts where two or more counties are united causes may be tried and
business transacted in any and all of the counties continuously and simultaneously without regard to the beginning or ending of terms, and the
same judge may try causes and transact business simiultaneously in more
than one county.
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS
Consumer Loan Act
Usury and the plight of the small loan debtor is not a new problem,
but it has become more acute as society has become more urban and industrial. Montana has now joined the great majority of states which have
some type of special legislation regulating the lending of small amounts
of money.
The main provisions of the Montana Consumer Loan Act contained
in Chapter 283 (Sub. H.B. 123) are as follows: All lenders who make a
business of making loans of $1000 or less and who wish to avail themselves
of the special interest rates must be licensed by the state. The law operates
as an exception to the usury law and allows licensees to charge maximum
interest rates which vary from 20% per year on the part of a loan not
exceeding $300 to 12% per year on the part of a loan in excess of $500
but not exceeding $1000. In lieu of the 20%, on loans of $90 or less a
licensee may charge $1 for each $5, and a period of at least 15 days must
be allowed for the repayment of each $5.00. An additional charge of 5%
may be made on any part of the loan past due, to be charged only once.
'Id. at § 93-1501-7, as amended by Laws of Montana 1949, ch. 113, 1 1,
W. at §§ 93-315, -316.
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Also a charge may be made for actual fees paid a public official for filing,
recording or releasing instruments securing the loan. All further charges
either direct or indirect are prohibited.
Contract periods are limited to 21 months on loans of $300 or less,
and 25 months on loans in excess of $300, and the loan contracts must provide for payment in installments.
Assignment of wages as security cannot exceed 10% of the wages, and
such assignments must be in writing and signed by the borrower. Further,
if the borrower is married the assignment must be signed by both husband
and wife, unless they are living separate and apart. Insurance may be required only in connection with loans exceeding $300.
A borrower must be given a copy of the contract showing its terms
clearly and distinctly.
The act creates the office of Consumer Loan Commissioner, who is
the state bank examiner. Licensees are required to keep books and records
as the Commissioner may require, and to make detailed reports to the
Commissioner. The Commissioner is given power to investigate licensees,
any person soliciting loans in amounts of $1000 or less, and any person
whom the Commissioner has reason to believe is violating the act. He is
required to make annual examinations of licensees.
The Commissioner is given power to suspend or revoke licenses for
knowing violations of the act, to issue cease and desist orders, and to apply
to the courts for injunctions and receivership.
Appeals to the district court may be taken from orders of the Commissioner, and the party appealing or the Commissioner may appeal from
the district court.
Violations of the act are misdemeanors and loans in violation of it
are void and uncollectable as to both interest and principal.
It should be noted that banks, trust companies, savings or building
and loan associations, credit unions, Morris Plan companies, pawnbrokers,
and persons extending credit in connection with the sale of a commodity
are exempt from the provisions of the act and are ineligible to become
licensees under its provisions.
Retail Installment Sales
The great increase in retail installment credit in the United States
has brought concern for the protection of consumers from unconscionable
business practices. The trend is toward comprehensive retail installment
legislation, such as was first adopted in Indiana in 1935.' Chapter 282
(H.B. 89), the Montana Retail Installment Sales Act, is a statute of this
kind.
The Montana legislation regulates retail installment selling and financing of goods, including motor vehicles. It vests supervisory powers in the
superintendent of banks.
Persons engaging in the business of a sales finance company, except
banks, trust companies and savings and loan associations authorized to do
8
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business in the state, are required to obtain a license. The superintendent
of banks is given power to investigate licensees and retail sellers.
Provisions requiring disclosure to the buyer of the terms of the transaction and his rights therein are fundamental. The contract must be in
writing, in at least eight point type, with caveats in at least ten point bold
type that he is not to sign before he has read or if the contract contains
blank spaces, that he is entitled to a copy, and has a right to pay off in
advance the full amount due and obtain a partial refund of the finance
charge. If the contract is for a motor vehicle it must contain in at least
ten point bold type a statement that liability insurance coverage is not included, if that is the case. These requirements are made meaningful by a
further requirement that the seller deliver or mail to the buyer a copy of
the contract, and by a provision that the buyer may rescind until the
seller does so. Any acknowledgment by the buyer of delivery of a copy
must be in at least ten point bold type and, if contained in the contract,
must appear directly above the buyer's signature.
There are also provisions for documentary disclosures to the buyer
which evidence the progress and completion of the payment obligation.
The buyer must be given a written receipt for any payment when made
in cash, and upon written request -the buyer must be given a written
statement of the dates and amounts of payments and the total amount
unpaid under the contract.
The act specifies what the contract must contain. Included in the required items are: (1) the cash price; (2) the amount of the down payment, and a description of any goods traded in; (3) the difference between items (1) and (2) ; (4) the amount for insurance and other benefits, specifying the types of coverage and benefits; (5) the amount of official fees; (6) the principal balance, defined as the sum of items (3),
(4) and (5) ; (7) the amount of the finance charge; (8) the time balance,
and the number of installments and the due date of each.
There are limitations as to insurance which not only relate to disclosure, by requiring the policy or certificate to be sent to the buyer, but
which also relate to rate limitations, who may be insurers, and the kinds
of insurance which may be included in the contract. If any insurance
is cancelled or the premium adjusted, any refund of premium must be
credited to the final maturing installment of the contract, except as applied toward similar insurance.
Rates and charges are controlled. Maximum permissible finance
charges as to motor vehicles vary from 7% to 11% per year, depending
upon the class to which the vehicle belongs. On services and goods other
than motor vehicles the permissible finance charges vary from 7% to 11%,
depending upon the amount of the principal balance. A minimum finance
charge of $20.00 may be charged on any retail installment transaction.
Additional charges which may be made by reason of the buyer's failure
to meet the schedule of payments in the contract are limited.
Refinancing charges are also controlled. The seller is permitted to
compute such a charge on the unpaid time balance by adding the cost of
any insurance and other benefits incidental to the refinancing plus any
accrued delinquency and collection charges, after deducting any refund
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1958
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which may be due the buyer for a prepayment. In the case of a motor
vehicle, it may be reclassified by its year model at the time of the refinancing for the purpose of computing the charge. The maximum permissible finance rates also apply to refinancing.
Any waiver of the provisions of the act are unenforceable and void.
Three sanctions are prescribed. First, engaging in the business of a
sales finance company without a license is a misdemeanor. Second, the
superintendent of banks has the power, after hearing, to suspend or revoke licenses of persons engaged in the business of financing retail sales
for violation of the act or fraud. Such an order is reviewable in the courts
by certiorari. Third, any person violating a requirement as to the contract, a limitation upon finance charges, a provision for refunds on prepayments, or a provision with respect to refinancing, except as the result
of accidental or bona fide error, is barred from recovering any finance,
delinquency or collection charge.
Auction Sales
The provision of the Public Auction Law of 1955 for exemptions from
the act of sales by individuals of new merchandise was amended by Chapter
225 (H.B. 221). The amendment strikes the limitation that the property
was assessed personal property tax, but it limits the exemption to sales by
individuals who maintain an established retail sales place of business in
the county in which the sale is held.
Motor Vehicle Registration Renewal
The law respecting the renewal of registration of motor vehicles was
amended by Chapter 100 (S.B. 37) to restrict the use of temporary windshield stickers. The amendment prohibits the sale or purchase of more
than one sticker when the vehicle ownership has not changed. Also, the
three day grace period from the date of purchase from a duly licensed
dealer is for the purpose of making application for registration and obtaining registration plates, rather than for the purpose of making application for a sticker.
CORPORATIONS
Incorporation
Chapter 142 (H.B. 372) amends R.C.M. 1947, section 14-102, so as to
expressly require that the articles of incorporation of a credit union be
filed with the Secretary of State and in the local county clerk and recorder's
office. Although the existing law had provided that "credit unions shall
be under the supervision of the State Examiner," the present Act also
requires that proposed articles of incorporation first be submitted to him
for his approval, which must be given in writing, before the articles are
filed. Since the old law assumed the filing of a credit union's articles,
without formally dealing with that step, the relevant provisions found in
the general corporation code were applicable, prior to this amendment.
However, whether intentionally or not, the present Act varies the general
1

Laws of Montana 1955, ch. 111, 1 10.
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provision for filing, by reversing the offices in which the original and the
copy are filed. Though R.C.M. 1947, section 15-111, governing filing generally, requires filing of the original articles with the county clerk and
recorder, and a certified copy thereof with the Secretary of State (who
then issues the certificate of incorporation), under the new Act, a
credit union's articles are first filed with the Secretary of State and the
certified copy filed with the county clerk and recorder at the principal
place of business.
Stock Transfers

Chapter 136 (H.B. 469) intends to make clear and explicit the law
measuring the liability of a corporation or its transferring agent, for
transferring its stock on the demand of a fiduciary thereof, for frauds or
deviations from his fiduciary duties where such transfer contributes to
such fraud or deviation. However, it absolves the corporation or transferring agent of any liability therefor, except in the case of actual knowledge of the intended fraud, or "with knowledge of such facts that its or
their participation of such registration or transfer amounts to bad faith."
Taxation

In 1955, by appropriate amendment of its statutes regulating the state
income tax, Montana committed itself to the rather unusual policy of
adapting its income tax law so as to make many of its provisions identical
with that of federal income tax law, thus permitting substantially the
same tax base to be used for one as for the other. Chapter 122 (S.B. 126)
was passed in further pursuance of that policy, with respect to "corporate income" regulations. It amends Chapter 15 of Title 84, R.C.M.
1947, by adding a new section thereto, numbered section 84-1501.1. Its
purpose is to adopt essentially the same provisions for computing Montana
taxes, as are contained in the now famous "Subehapter S" of the federal
Internal Revenue Code, permitting certain classes of small business corporations to elect not to be taxed as corporations, but to have the income
(or loss) reported directly by the shareholders as if the firm were a
partnership, thus avoiding the notorious "double taxation" of corporate
profits.' Interestingly, though Chapter 15, Title 84, is entitled "licensing
tax," and so is applicable to certain income items to which standard income taxes are not applicable, the Montana legislature has seen fit to
amend this section to implement their policy of paralleling the federal
income tax law.

Chapter 264 (H.B. 303) increases from 37 to 5% the "license tax,"
based on the net income derived from business done in Montana, and imposed both on domestic and foreign corporations, by amending R.C.M. 1947,
aWhere applicable this provision would seem to give some relief to the "double double" taxation, which, though very common, Is commented on adversely by Roland
Renne, President of Montana State College, in RENNE, THE GOVERNMENT AND ADActually, many corporate profits may be
MINISTRATION OF MONTANA 139 (1958).
subjected to n number of double taxations. But various commentators taking a
"second look" at double federal taxation find several possible objections to It,
when correlated with state law. See Hoffman, Let's Go Slow With Taw Option
Corporations, 37 TAxEs 21 (1959); Stine, Subchapter S Election Mai Increase
State Income Taw on Corporation or Stockholders, 10 J. TX.ATION 91 (1969).

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1958

7

MONTANA
REVIEW
Montana Law
Review, Vol.LAW
20 [1958],
Iss. 2, Art. 9

[Vol. 20,

section 84-1501 to that effect, provided, however, that "as to all taxable
periods ending on or after December 31, 1960,

. .

. the percentage of net

income to be paid under this act shall be 41/2%." Although the title
states that the act provides for the "broadening of the tax base for foreign corporations," it does not appear to do so in fact. As originally
printed, the bill proposed that the state, as the corporate domicil. subject Montana corporations to such tax on the "total net income received
...from all sources." However, as finally approved, both domestic and
foreign corporations are subjected to identically the same tax base of
"total net income received . ..from all sources, within the state of, Montana . . . ," the same base used heretofore. This act also increases the

minimum tax due under section 84-1501 from $5.00, to $10.00 annually.
CRIMINAL LAW
Vehicular and Traffic Regulations
The considerable activity in the field of highway, vehicular and
traffic regulation which has marked recent legislative sessions continued
in the 1959 session. T~he particular subjects dealt with varied from
"authority to set state-wide speed limits," to "vehicular weight limits,"
to further consideration of the power of municipalities to regulate traffic.
Speed Limit
Public interest was centered on the question of the power of the highway patrol board to set state-wide speed limits. It had asserted that
power under the authority given it by R.C.M. 1947, section 32-2145, to
establish "state speed zones" under certain conditions, by announcing that
sixty-five miles per hour would be the maximum daylight speed limit
throughout the state, and erected signs to that effect.
In House Bill 14 the board hoped to get the legislature to confirm, or
at least validate that action, by amending section 41, chapter 263, Laws of
Montana 1955, to add an express provision to the three categories of
maximum speed already dealt with therein, so as to make it unlawful to
travel anywhere in the state in excess of "sixty-five (65) miles per hour
in such other locations [than those requiring a lesser speed] during daylight hours."
But this bill was killed and, instead, Chapter 204 (S.B.
34) was enacted, amending section 32-2145, R.C.M. 1947, authorizing
special speed zones, by adding to it the following sentence: "This Act is
not in any way to be construed as authority to set a state-wide speed
limit." With this the legislature made as clear as it could, its intention
to retain control over the matter of general speed limits.
Accident Reporting
Montana adopted a comprehensive accident reporting code in the
Uniform Accident Reporting Act, back in 1947. Chapter 256 (H.B. 107)
amends the uniform act, R.C.M. 1947, sections 32-120 through -1217, in
several details, most of them minor, though the following changes merit
mention:
1. Amends section 32-1202 by transferring the power to suspend or
revoke licenses from the registrar of motor vehicles to the highway patrol
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol20/iss2/9
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board, and by reducing the maximum revocation period for leaving the
scene of an accident from three years, to one year (by incorporating the
limiting provisions therefor in section 31-149). This revocation power is,
of course, in addition to criminal penalties. Further, both in this and in
further sections dealing with license revocations, the authority to "suspend
or revoke" is expressly extended to non-residents as well as residents;
as to non-residents, the privilege to operate or drive in Montana is withdrawn.
2. Amends 32-1206, seemingly so as to require any driver causing
any damage to any kind of personal property lawfully on the road, to
"take reasonable steps to locate and notify the owner thereof."
3. Amends section 32-1207, requiring the giving of notice to local
officers in case of injury or death, by adding a third reason for having to
so report: "or property damage to the apparent extent of $100."
4. Amends 32-1208, requiring a "written report," by raising the
property damage limitation from $25 to $100, and changing the official
recipient thereof from the "supervisor" to the "board."
5. Further, when the driver is physically incapable of reporting at
once, any other capable occupant has that duty, and, if the driver is not
the owner, then the latter has the duty to make the written report.
6. Included in this amendment to section 32-1209 is a stiff criminal
penalty for making a false report-a maximum $500 fine, and/or six
months imprisonment.
7. Section 32-1210 is amended to expressly make it a misdemeanor
not to report such accidents, with $25 maximum fine, and suspension of
license or permit, until such report has been filed.
Municipalities
Chapter 240 (H.B. 103) continues to deal with the problem raised by
a leading case in 1956, City of Billings v. Herold, 296 P.2d 263, which ruled
that a municipality had no jurisdiction to enact ordinances regulating
driving on the city streets while intoxicated or under the influence of
narcotics. Legislation in 1957 gave limited relief from the difficulties
resulting from this case by authorizing such ordinances with respect to
certain kinds of regulations, including drunk driving. The present act,
however, amends R.C.M. 1947, section 32-2131, already providing for some
municipal regulations, by adding this "universal power" clause: "14. Enacting as ordinances any and all provisions of this act and any and all
other acts regulating traffic, pedestrians, vehicles and operators, thereof,
not in conflict with state law or federal regulations and to enforce the same
within their jurisdiction."
That provision should pretty well solve the
problem of municipal jurisdiction over highways and traffic within its
limits.
Water Vehicles and Traffic
Both 1955 and 1957 legislation touched lightly on the regulation of
water traffic by requiring life preservers in sufficient numbers to protect
all passengers, and by making it a misdemeanor to violate that law, with
a maximum fine of $10 as a penalty.
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1958
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Chapter 285 (Sub. H.B. 15) really lowers the boom. Both in minuteness and comprehensiveness, it compares very favorably with our accumulated codes governing highway vehicles and traffic. Some idea of its
scope may be gleaned from its title:
... prescribing rules and regulations for numbering and registering motorboats and vessels ... defining terms and designating the
fish and game commission . . .as the state agency responsible for
the administration of said act . . .providing minimum equipment
requirements . . .establishing safety regulations . . . establishing
safety regulations for the use of water-skis, surfboards, etc....
providing penalties . . . repealing sections 94-35-266, 94-35-267,
and 94-35-268 (the sections enacted in 1955 as amended in
1957) .. ."
The detail and particularity of this act relative to the earlier legislation is suggested by the fact that, whereas the only requirement formerly
was that there be enough preservers to go around, under this act all children under 13 must wear them at all times, and all skiers and boat operators pulling skiers also must wear them. The registration is as formal
and complete as for cars-indeed such registrations must be reported to
the registrar of motor vehicles by the commission. Safe driving and
handling, duties at an accident, provision for elaborate equipment and
safety devices, drunken operation, all are dealt with in an act, as is a
considerable body of rules to establish who has the "right-of-way."
Further, liability is imposed on the owner for injuries and collisions resulting
from careless or negligent handling, or in violation of this act, whether
he is operating the boat or not, if it is being operated with his permission,
expressed or implied. This is a liability not imposed in automobile cases.
A presumption of consent follows from operation of the boat by any member of the family or near relative. A duty to report accidents is imposed.
Moreover, whereas formerly the maximum penalty for violation was $10,
that is now the minimum, with a maximum of $500.00 and/or thirty days
imprisonment. All in all, the waters of Montana, for recreational purposes
are really being regulated.
Miscellaneous Traffic Provisions
In addition to making it a misdemeanor to drive while one's license
is suspended or revoked, R.C.M. 1947, section 31-155 also has directed
the board to "double" the period for a suspended license, but to refuse
to issue a new license, where the original was revoked, for a full year
beyond the date the driver otherwise would be entitled to one. Chapter
84 (S.B. 71) amends this section so as to require the board to extend the
"disability" period in such case for a second period identical in term to
the first one.
Chapter 201 (H.B. 177), regulates the equipment which any kind of
tow car must carry, to increase safety to others, by assuring adequate
warning of possible danger. This equipment includes several varieties of
red flares, lanterns and lights, approved by the highway patrol board,
warning signs, visible day and night, two-quart fire extinguisher, broom
for sweeping up broken glass, shovel to cover slick, oily spots with dirt,
electric extension cord for disabled car, and a flashing or steady red light
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol20/iss2/9
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on top of car or crane. When necessary to obstruct the road, highway
warning signs must be placed 200 feet on either side of the wreck. A
few of the requirements apply particularly to "commercial" towing cars,
but the bulk of them apply to "every tow car used to tow a vehicle by
means of a crane, tow bar, tow line," etc. Violation of the act is a misdemeanor, with a maximum fine of $100 as penalty.
Heretofore R.C.M. 1947, section 53-623, has made it a misdemeanor,
with maximum sentences of $300 fine and/or sixty days in jail, to operate
certain vehicles on the highways weighing more than the gross vehicle
weight marked on the vehicle itself, pursuant to section 53-628. Apparently, though, there are other records which may show a different weight.
Chapter 226 (S.B. 165) amends this section so as to make it a violation
of the section if the actual weight exceeds that contained in any of the
official records mentioned, such as in the owner's certificate of registration and tax receipt, pursuant to 53-107, as amended. It concludes with
a proviso, however, which saves the truck owner "if the gross maximum
weight marked upon such vehicle is less than the gross vehicle weight shown
on the owner's registration tax receipt or on the gross vehicle weight
receipt, and such receipt shows the gross vehicle weight fee has been paid
for the weight stated thereon."
Contributing to Delinquency
In 1955 it developed that different district courts in Montana were
giving conflicting constructions to the following language of R.C.M. 1947,
section 10-617, describing the classes of persons who may be guilty of contributing to the delinquency of a minor: "Any parent or parents, legal
guardian, or other person." Some courts insisted that the phrase "other
person" must be limited by the character of the named classes preceding
it; hence the entire statute applied only to persons who stood in a fiduciary
relation to the child, and/or to the state concerning the child. The more
orthodox view, taken by other courts, was that a prosecution could be
brought against any person who in fact "contributed" to the child's waywardness. For some reason an attempt to clarify the section in 1957 failed.
Chapter 22 (H.B. 75) intends to clarify the statute so as to make
certain that any such person may be prosecuted and convicted thereunder.
It does that by adding the word "any" so as to make section 10-617 read
"any other person." Let's hope it does the trick.
Penal Provisions Affecting Business
It is a misdemeanor to remove the inspection seal from weighing and
measuring devices. Chapter 78 (S.B. 139) makes proof of removal by
anyone of the seal on a device he owns or uses prima facie evidence of his
guilt.
The legislature made it a felony for anyone to solicit or take compensation in return for a contract to advertise another's property for sale,
if he makes false statements concerning the services he will render or suppresses pertinent information for the purpose of inducing the other to
enter into the contract. Chapter 125 (S.B. 186).
Chapter 69 (S.B. 200) makes it a misdemeanor to manufacture, sell,
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offer for sale, or ship within the state any paint product without a clear
label naming the manufacturer and giving full analysis of the content.
Possession of offending products by a dealer is prima facie evidence of
guilt.
Chapter 207 (S.B. 68) is of importance to the timber industry. It
punishes by a fine of $100 to $1000 anyone engaged in cutting timber or
conducting standing improvement of timber lands or clearing a right of
way therein who fails to reduce fire hazard by proper disposal of slash or
debris or who fails in the alternative tO enter into a contract with the State
Forester by which the latter is to manage or reduce the hazard.
Other Miscellaneous Statutes
Bottle Clubs
Chapter 200 (Sub. H.B. 305) makes operation of a "bottle
misdemeanor.

club"

a

Dumping
Chapter 237 (H.B. 215) enlarged the existing statute to prohibit
dumping of any other debris or refuse as well as garbage, in public recreational property as well as public streets and highways. Violation is a misdemeanor.
False Pretenses
The statutory crime of false pretenses is extended by Chapter 130
(S.B. 106) beyond its traditional scope. It is now a crime to obtain
services as well as money or property by designedly fraudulent representations.
Fireworks
The existing law regulating fireworks was substantially altered by
Chapter 273 (H.B. 171). The new law limits the sale of fireworks to
certain permissible varieties, and to the period between June 24th and July
5th. The second section of the bill raises a problem. It makes it unlawful
to possess fireworks "except as hereinafter provided," and goes on to
permit supervised public displays. In the old statute such items as could
be sold were by definition not "fireworks."
By the present statute they
are "fireworks," but are referred to as "permissible fireworks." Though
the language is badly chosen the intent seems to be to retain basically the
same law as existed before, which would permit possession of the "permissible fireworks" at any time. The penalty for violation of the statute
is increased.
Lewd Acts
Chapter 57 (H.B. 203) increased the penalty for commission of a
lewd or lascivious act upon a child under sixteen, from a maximum of five
years to a maximum of twenty-five years.
Motion Pictures
Back in the infancy of the movies-in 1907-the legislature forbade
the corruption of public morals by the depicting in motion pictures of a
burglary, train robbery, or any other felony. Perhaps because the police
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have not been fully enforcing the law of late the legislature repealed this
statute. Chapter 52 (H.B. 218).
Narcotics
Penalties for violation of the Uniform Drug Act have been substantially increased by Chapter 6 (H.B. 39). For a first offense the penalty has
been changed from fine up to $1000 and/or six months imprisonment to
imprisonment for one to five years; for subsequent offense the change is
from fine up to $5000 and/or five years imprisonment to imprisonment
for five to twenty years.
Nuisance
R.C.M. 1947, § 94-1002, designating any building or place used as a
resort for gambling or narcotics or as a place of assignation to be a
nuisance subject to abatement, has been amended to include also a "tract
of land under one ownership." Chapter 268 (S.B. 137). There is some
problem, though, when one turns to the later provision for abatement of
the nuisance by sale of personalty found in the building or place declared
a nuisance, because "tract of land" is not included there.
CRIMINAL LAW ADMINISTRATION
Police and Police Practices
Law Enforcement Academy
A significant step toward the professionalization of police service in
Montana was taken with the adoption of Chapter 7 (H.B. 11), creating
the Montana Law Enforcement Academy. The Academy, limited to annual sessions of three weeks, is to be governed by an advisory board of
seven men representing organizations specially concerned with law enforcement. The board is empowered to choose the academy site, establish qualifications for admission, select students from the qualified applicants, determine curriculum, select faculty, and establish regulations for the operation of the school. Time spent by officers in attending the Academy is
treated as time on the job, and the local government units are empowered
to expend limited funds to pay board, room, and travel expenses.!
Radar
Chapter 120 (S.B. 52) makes evidence of the speed of a motor vehicle
obtained by radar measurement admissible in court. Presumably, then,
no expert testimony will be necessary to establish the validity of radar
measurements in general, but it should still be necessary to establish the
accuracy of the particular measurement in question by showing that the
machine was tested both before and afterward."
The same statute makes special provision for arrest without warrant
in those speeding cases where radar is used to detect the violation. The
'The first session of the Academy was held on the Montana State College campus
in Bozeman for two weeks beginning in March. Thirty-nine officers were selected
to attend.
0
' This is the position reached by the New York court even without a statute in People
v. Magri, 3 N.Y.2d 562, 170 N.Y.S.2d 335 (1958).
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officer who observes the recording of speed on the electronic device may
arrest without a warrant, provided he makes it upon immediate, uninterrupted pursuit and is in uniform or shows his badge. This is no real
change from existing law because such officer can ordinarily be said to
be present when the offense is committed. The statute further provides
that an officer down the road, who merely learns of the fact of violation
by radio message, is permitted to arrest without warrant, provided he is
furnished with adequate identification of the vehicle, is notified of the
recorded speed immediately after its recording, makes the arrest as the
result of immediate and uninterrupted pursuit, and is in uniform or displays a badge. This is an innovation, for under the general law mere
information of an offense, not committed in one's presence, is insufficient
for arrest without warrant for a minor offense.
By its terms the arrest provisions of the law are not to be effective
unless signs giving warning of the use of radar in the state are placed at
the state line and outside county seats and towns having over 2500 population." Similar warning must be given at major entrances to a municipality
before radar may be used therein for law enforcement purposes.
Roadblocks
Erection of temporary roadblocks for the purpose of identifying drivers, checking vehicles for proper equipment, and apprehending wanted
criminals is specifically permitted by Chapter 60 (H.B. 163). Officers are
required to set up signs and warning lights to prevent collisions, and anyone proceeding through the roadblock wrongfully is guilty of a misdemeanor. While the emergency roadblock to apprehend a dangerous escaping criminal seems clearly permissible, ' there is a serious question whether
the roadblock set up for a general check of licenses, safety equipment, intoxication or the like is constitutional. In a recent decision a Florida
Circuit Court held a roadblock for such purposes violative of both the state
and federal constitutions. The court emphasized that a desirable end
cannot justify an unconstitutional means.'
Juvenile Offenders
There were three separate bills before the legislature to limit or abolish
the cloak of secrecy covering juvenile procedings-House Bills 10, 58, and
71. All three were killed.
Chapter 215 (S.B. 16) gave to the district court exclusive original
jurisdiction over traffic offenses committed by children under eighteen.
It is doubtful that the requirement of secrecy under R.C.M. 1947, section
10-611 applies in the district court. The bill provides that if after a
hearing before the court the child is found to have unlawfully operated a
motor vehicle the court (1) may impose a fine up to $50, (2) may revoke
or suspend his driver's license, and (3) may order any motor vehicle
'The provision requiring warning signs is somewhat ambiguous as to where they
must be located.
'HouTS, FRoM ARS-T To REEASE 48 (1958).
"Aronovitz v. City of Miami, 27 LAw Wmx 2448 (Dade Cty. Cir. Ct., Fla., Feb. 20,
1959). The court cites a similar ruling of the Superior Court of Sonoma County,
California, in People v. Knight, June 6, 1958.
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owned by the child or operated by him with the owner's consent impounded
for a period up to 60 days. If a fine is not paid, the second and third
measures may be taken until it is paid, but imprisonment may not be imposed for non-payment of the fine.
Any police officer witnessing the unlawful operation of a car by one
under eighteen may issue a summons directing the offender to report to
the district court. While it is doubtful that such a summons is of any
more legal force to require appearance than the ordinary traffic ticket,
there is little question of its practical effectiveness.
Finally, the bill seems to contemplate a simple judicial hearing and
determination, without participation of jury. The statute leaves unanswered such questions as whether the offender may demand a jury
trial, what the rights of innocent car owners are, and who must pay the
cost of impounding and garaging the car.
Court Proceedings
House Bill 443, which was killed, would have altered the existing rule
forbidding more than one crime to be charged in a single information by
adopting the federal rule, which permits the charging of any number of
offenses which are connected in their commission or which are of the same
class of crime even though otherwise unrelated.
Disqualifying Judge
Chapter 61 (H.B. 70) permits a judge to be disqualified arbitrarily
at the instance of either party to a criminal action. T~his is an extension
of the "Fair Trial Bill" enacted in the days when Judge Clancy was alleged to be a pawn of F. Augustus Heinze in his battles against the Anaconda Company. Though the language of R.C.M. 1947, section 93-901 was
not limited to civil actions, it was so construed by the state supreme court.
After repeated attempts the principle of peremptory challenge of the judge
has been extended to criminal actions. The language is largely copied
from section 93-901, but the provisions differ in the following respects:
The affidavit of bias and prejudice must be filed fifteen, rather than five
days before trial or hearing. Only one judge can be disqualified by the
prosecution and one by the defense (even with multiple defendants) instead
of two. The provision does not apply to contempt proceedings, a qualification which though not appearing in the civil statute has also been recognized therein by the cases.
Sentencing
A proposed habitual criminal statute-Senate Bill 122-was killed. It
would have made mandatory a life sentence upon third conviction of felony
or upon a fifth conviction of even a misdemeanor if intent to defraud were
involved.
Part-time Imprisonment
A sensible innovation in sentencing has been codified in Chapter 249
(H.B. 157). It permits the court, upon request of the county attorney
and sheriff and with the consent of a convicted person who is sentenced
to the county jail and who has a job, to grant "parole" during the prisoner's regular hours of employment. This permits the prisoner to retain
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1958
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his job, even though he must be confined during his off hours. His earnings must be collected by the sheriff and used to pay his board and personal expenses both inside and outside the jail, and to support his dependents as ordered by the court; the sheriff retains any balance until
the prisoner is discharged. The use of the term parole seems unfortunate,
since it conflicts with its usage in the Probation, Parole and Executive
Clemency Act.'
Probation would better have been used. A substantial
problem is raised by the provision that the committing court may, upon
request of the county attorney and sheriff, reduce the prisoner's sentence
up to one-fourth if his conduct warrants it. The court can likewise cancel
this diminution. If the court has power to reduce sentence after commitment of the prisoner to jail, it probably has power to cancel that reduction; but if the reduction is properly a commutation of sentence, it is a
power reserved by the state constitution to the executive branch of government.' Eveh if the provision for reduction of sentence should be invalid,
the provision for freedom during working hours could stand alone.
Prisons
Montana's prison system should be substantially improved by a number of new laws.
Construction
By approving House Bill 424 the legislature and governor permitted
the question of a $5,000,000 bond issue for prison construction to go before
the people. It will appear on the ballots in the November election, 1960.
Prison Commissioners
Chapter 194 (H.B. 43) puts on the same ballot the abolition of the
constitutionally created board of state prison commissioners, presently constituted of the governor, secretary of state and attorney general. Adoption
of this constitutional amendment would pave the way for a statutory board
of corrections made up of persons more directly concerned with prison
work.
Warden
By Chapter 58 (H.B. 47) the warden of the state penitentiary must
be specially trained and experienced in prison work in a managerial capacity; his salary is increased from $7600 to $8400 per year, plus free
housing and food for himself and his family; his rights to full hearing
before discharge are spelled out in detail; his tenure is no longer specified,
so that he is removable now only for misconduct until he reaches compulsory retirement age of 65, after which he may be continued on a year-toyear basis.
Guards
Guards may hereafter be suspended, demoted or discharged by the
warden only for cause upon a sworn, written charge of misconduct; they
have, too, the right to appeal to the board of state prison commissioners
"R.C.M. 1947, §§ 94-9821 to -9851.
"5State em rel. Bottomly v. District Court, 73 Mont. 541, 237 Pac. 525 (1925).
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and obtain there a full hearing." Along with the more usual causes for
discharge we find listed active participation in any political campaign,
even including any direct or indirect financial contribution. All employments as custodial officers or promotions to lieutenant or captain are
merely probational for six months. These provisions all appear in Chapter 242 (H.B. 44).
1959]

Prison Industry
By Chapter 14 (H.B. 48) prisoners may hereafter be given incentive
payment for their work in prison industry in amounts ranging from two
cents to fifty cents per day, depending upon the job performed. The funds
come from the profits of prison industry.
Using Prison Facilities of Other States
The Western Interstate Corrections Compact was adopted by Chapter
236 (H.B. 435) to facilitate interchange of prisoners among the states in
the Rocky Mountains and westward. What has been done on a less formal
basis is now to be specifically authorized by statute. The compact can
result in substantial savings to the states and in superior facilities for rehabilitation of offenders. In simplest terms the compact permits one
state to make a contractual arrangement with another to send convicts, reformatory inmates, or mentally ill or defective persons who are lawfully
committed, to the second state for confinement. The receiving state acts
as agent for the sending state in confining, rehabilitating or treating the
inmate. The sending state may at any time reclaim the inmate unless he
is wanted in the receiving state for some offense committed there.
The governor, with the assent of the board of examiners, is empowered
to enter into contracts on behalf of the state pursuant to the compact, and
all courts, departments and officers of the state are required to do whatever is appropriate to effectuate the purposes of the compact.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
Colloquy
The public's principal interest in bills concerning domestic relations
was centered primarily on a series of bills attempting to deal with the socalled "contract marriage" in Montana. In the past, it has erroneously
been assumed, both officially and unofficially, that R.C.M. 1947, sections
48-130 to 48-132, inclusive, authorize a highly informal method for effecting a "marriage" simply by mutual agreement in writing.' The practice based on this assumption has continued-indeed has been greatly
accelerated-by the enactment of R.C.M. 1947, section 48-134, which re'These safeguards are now basically similar to those of the highway patrol in R.C.M.

1947, § 31-105.

7

" State v. Newman, 66 Mont. 180, 192, 213 Pac. 805 (1923).

See also, Webb, The

Purpose of the Declarationof Marriage in Montana, 10 MONT. L. REv. 76 (1949) ;

Briggs, The "ContractMarriage" is Invalid, 18 MONr. L. RE-v. 43 (1956). Webb does
not make the most of State v. Newman, but the second article relies and builds on
the technical analysis of the relevant Code sections found in his comment, without repeating it. Hence, one interested In historical background should begin with
Webb's study.
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quires a pre-marital blood test as a condition to the securing of a marriage
license. However, such practice clearly conflicts with the intendment of
that statute. The several bills introduced which considered this problem
attempted to deal with it in a number of ways. Only two of these bills
survived.
Marriage
Ceremony
House Bill 4 proposed simply to repeal sections 48-130 through 48-1-33,
even though it was pointed out recently that these sections do serve a
legitimate purpose when properly construed and limited.' This bill was
killed.
House Bill 64, which was intended only to supplement House Bill 4,
would have amended section 48-133, simply by deleting the clause, "or refused to join in a declaration thereof." The apparent purpose of this
was to delete all reference in the statutes to the "declaration of marriage," which was the phrase relied on to support the simple "contract
marriage." It likewise was defeated.
Chapter 275 (S.B. 70), amends R.C.M. 1947, section 48-130, so as to
authorize what in substance amounts to still another, though less formal,
ceremony as an alternative to the one generally provided for in section
48-116, enumerating the various officials qualified to officiate at a marmriage. Whereas heretofore section 48-130, correctly interpreted, applied
only to marriages already consummated (though by informal or irregular
means, as e.g., a common law marriage), the amended section now reads:
"Declaration of marriage without solemnization . . . persons desiring to
consummate a marriage by written declaration . . . without the solemnization provided for in section 48-116. . . ." This new language expressly

validates the use of the "declaration of marriage" as an alternative "ceremonial procedure."
However, no direct statement is made as to whether
this informal procedure has to be supported by a marriage license to be
valid. The writer has maintained in the past that the validity of every
ceremonial procedure authorized by our statutes, however informal it may
be, must be supported by the prior issuance of a marriage license. However, the history of the "marriage contract" in practice, combined with
the additional new requirements and limitations upon the use of the "declaration of marriage," supports the conclusion that, under it, the "marriage license" requirement is dispensed with. This Act also amends section 48-130 to require the securing of the pre-marital medical certificate
generally required by section 48-134, and the affixing of that certificate
to the declaration of marriage. Heretofore these procedures have been
absolute conditions to the securing of a marriage license. Section 48-134
also is amended further so as to require in the declaration of marriage
still additional information normally required for a license. This information includes: the name of the father of each of the parties, the
maiden name of the mother of both, and the address of each; also a statement that both parties are competent to marry; all this data must be attested by two witnesses, and formally acknowledged before the clerk of
18

Webb, supra note 17, at 78-79; Briggs, supra note 17, at 45.
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the district court where registered. Moreover, the amended section evades
the mandate of section 48-117, that, "Previous to the solemnization of
any marriage in this state a license for that purpose must be obtained
1959]

from the clerk of the district court. ...." The new bill avoids this latter

requirement by expressly stating that a marriage may be "consummated"
by means of the declaration of marriage without any "solemnization"
whatever.'
All of these restrictive limitations on the use of the "declaration of
marriage" as a means of creating a marriage, combine to obviate much
of the evil resulting from the loose, hurried and impulsive use of the
But beyond these restrictive limitations required for the
"declaration."
"declaration" itself, this Act provides for very serious penalties which,
combined with the restrictions, should assure generally responsible use
of the "declaration."
In effect, the Act requires literal complianceunless every step required by section 48-130 as amended is complied with,
the marriage will be void. Moreover, the minimum criminal penalties
provided for in section 3 of the Act, for any violation thereof is rather
substantial-" not less than $300.00 or six months in jail, or both." So,
although the remaining provision seeking to limit responsible use of the
new provision and making it "unlawful for any person, other than the
parties . . .to draw any such declaration of marriage unless he shall have

been duly licensed to practice law" may well be avoided by the use of form
agreements, there are grounds for hoping that this Act will help restore
some sanity to our law and practice regulating marriage.'
Chapter 276 (S.B. 69) recognizes that the true purpose of R.C.M. 1947,
sections 84-131 and 84-132 is to "reestablish records of formally existing
marriages, the records of which may have been destroyed in one way or
another. " It amends that section so as to make its meaning clear beyond
all dispute, this improving on the language recently suggested for that
purpose." Section 2 of this Act also amends R.C.M. 1947, section 84-132, so
"The amending language, "persons desiring to consummate a marriage by written
declaration," Introduces an irregular and confusing meaning to the word consummiating. By standard definition, the "consummating act" In a marriage is sexual
intercourse. However, that section as amended, raises the question of whether
it must be construed as amending by Implication section 48-101, which declares that
"consent alone will not constitute a marriage; it must be followed by a solemnization, or by mutual and public assumption of the marital relation." (Emphasis
added). Traditionally, the last phrase has been construed to refer only to a "public cohabitation."
'
Interestingly, this section provides only a minimum penalty of $300 and/or six
months In jail, with no stated maximum.
1This section, as amended, may be considered to be but a particular and somewhat
formalized application of the informal marriage ceremony long permitted under
section 48-128. That section declares that "in the solemnization of marriage no
particular form shall be required, except that the parties shall solemnly declare,
In the presence of the magistrate or minister, or of attending witnesses, that they
take each other as husband and wife, and In any case there shall be at least two
witnesses present at the ceremony." However, In the past, to validate any kind
of ceremony under this section, It had to be supported by a formal marriage license.
In view of this statutory history, probably it would have been better had section
48-130 been amended to read "solemnization by declaration of marriage," rather
than "declaration of marriage, without solemnization," and to have expressly
dispensed with the marriage license, If that were thought permissible.
"Briggs, supra. note 17, at 46.
"Id. at 50.
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as to make clear that the "declaration" which it refers to and requires to
be acknowledged and recorded, is the one provided for under section 48-131
to "reestablish the records for an existing marriage," and not the "contract of marriage" dealt with by section 84-130. Before amendment, this
section was extremely ambiguous in that respect.
Chapter 21 (H.B. 6), amends R.C.M. 1947, section 48-134, to expressly require that applicants for a marriage license present to the issuer,
"a birth certificate or other satisfactory evidence of age," and also "exhibit ...the consent required by section 48-118," from the parents of any
minor applicant. It appears that the court clerk always has been expected
to require satisfactory evidence that the applicants are qualified to marry,
under sections 48-117 through 48-121, regulating the issuing of licenses.
However, he has had a broad discretion as to what should constitute such
"satisfactory evidence." This Act seems to narrow his discretion substantially by limiting the character of the evidence which will be acceptable as proof of age. Also, although not expressly so providing in the
title, in requiring the "exhibiting of a written consent of the parents of a
minor," these sections seems to impliedly amend section 48-118, which
formerly required proof of parental consent "by the testimony of at least
one competent witness."
Adoption
Two of the more newsworthy bills in the domestic relations field failed
to secure approval. The legislature killed one and the governor vetoed
the other. Although Montana enacted the Uniform Adoption Act generally in 1957, not all of its provisions were included." Although House
Bill 232 and Senate Substitute for Senate Bill 74 were publicized as intending to make adoption easier, Montana law prior to 1957 had made
adoption "easier" in certain respects than did the Uniform Act. In particular, R.C.M. 1947, section 61-130, dealing generally with the requirement that the consent of the child's parents must be given before legal
adoption can be completed, listed some eight different classes of parents
whose consent did not have to be secured, thus making the adoption much
easier in many cases. Even as to these classes, however, section 61-130
required that all such parents be given notice of an adoption proceeding,
excepting only those already deprived of custody by a court judgment in
a neglected or dependent child hearing. The Uniform Act very generally
required parental consent in writing, excepting only those parents "whose
parental rights have been judicially terminated." When Montana adopted
the Uniform Act, it was modified to continue the several classes enumerated
in section 61-130, whose consent was not necessary. However, the 1957
Act failed to continue the "citation" requirements found in section 61-130,
thus failing to give those parents even the protection of receiving notice
of the pending adoption. These bills proposed to restore the provisions
requiring "service of process" by citation on such parents, originally appearing in section 61-130. So, instead of making adoption easier, they
were intended to "tighten up" the provisions of the Uniform Act as modified and adopted by Montana in 1957. And well might they be tightened
"See

Montana Legislative Summary, 1957, 18 MONT. L. Rrv. 121 (1957).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol20/iss2/9

20

MONTANA LEGISLATURE SUMMARY, 1959
Faculty: Montana Legislative Summary, 1959
in this respect, for the problem of protecting an award of adoption against
subsequent attack by the blood parents has always been a very sticky one;
and the United States Supreme Court is showing increasing sensitiveness
to the interests of both parents in the personal relationship to the child, in
all forms of custody proceedings. Hence every effort must be made to
assure compliance with the requirements of due process.'
Governor Aronson vetoed House Bill 232 for the published reason that
it might be interpreted as requiring the citation of parents in several
situations in which their rights had already been determined. This, he
said, would be intolerable. The Senate bill, killed by the legislature, had
contained a limitation on the requirement that parents be cited. This
limitation may have been what the Governor had in mind. Although the
protection which the vetoed bill would have given parents may be broader
than absolutely necessary for constitutional purposes, it may be desirable
to assure a "margin for error."
Both of these bills also intended to correct a defect in the original
bill adopting the Uniform Adoption Act in 1957, in its failure to formally
repeal the then existing Code sections dealing with adoption, even though
the bill's title expressly stated that to be one of its purposes. However,
these sections-61-127 through 61-137-would appear to be repealed wherever conflicting by the general repealing clause appearing in section 18
of that Act, as well as by implication and by the strongest kind of evidence of legislative intent.
1959]

FISH AND GAME
This generic heading covers diverse matters; all, however, relate to
the powers or regulations of the Fish and Game Commission. Chapter 96
(S.B. 134) enlarges the Commission's powers by granting authority over
recreational uses of public fishing reservoirs and lakes constructed by the
Commission or those which the Commission operates under agreements
with other state or federal agencies or private owners. Such rules as
the Commission promulgates are "subject to review and approval by the
State Board of Health as to public health and sanitation before becoming
effective." The Act amended section 26-104, Revised Codes of Montana,
1947, as amended.
Section 26-201 is amended by Chapter 34 (H.B. 111) to add the
"chukar partridge" to the classification of" upland game birds," to add the
"Canada lynx and black-footed ferret" to the class denominated "furbearing animals," and to remove the "lynx" and "black-footed ferret"
from the list of "predatory animals."
In addition, the "fox" was removed from the list of "fur-bearing animals." The purpose of the original
bill to add the "fox" to the list as a "predatory animal" was not effectuated in the enactment.
Two other amendments affected persons who work closely with personnel of the Fish and Game Department. Chapter 31 (H.B. 115) raised
the compensation paid license agents for each license issued from ten centto fifteen cents. By the terms of Chapter 12 (H.B. 68), taxidermists are
See May v. Anderson. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
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required to keep written records relating to articles of game, the license
number, name and address of the owner, to hold such records for at least
one year, and to open them for inspection by any game warden at any
reasonable time.
The interests of bow-and-arrow hunters and skin-and SCUBA-divers
are served by Chapters 36 and 44, respectively. The former (H.B. 67)
adds elk and antelope to the list (comprised only of "deer" prior to amendment) of animals which may be taken by bow-and-arrow in the areas and
subject to the regulations provided by the Commission. This act affected
section 26-104. Section 26-332 was amended by the latter chapter (H.B.
146) to provide that "rubber or spring propelled spears when employed
by sportsmen swimming or submerged in the water" may be used for the
taking of "designated species" of non-game fish. Furthermore, the amendment deletes the words '' and Dolly Varden trout" from the section. The
result is that this species may not be taken by "traps, seines, or nets."
There were these amendments concerning the licensing provisions of
the statutes: Chapter 27 (Sen. Sub. for S.B. 8) authorizes the Fish
and Game Commission to issue special nonresident antelope and deer licenses for a fee of $20.00 for each license. The licenses are valid only for
the area designated in the license and are good for only one year. Provision is made for public hearings by the Commission upon receipt of complaints from ten or more persons in any area designated for such nonresident hunting. With relation to determining a "resident for the purpose of issuing resident fishing and hunting licenses," Chapter 106 (S.B.
109) amends section 26-202.3 to include the spouses of armed forces members within the exception which allows them to obtain resident licenses
thirty days after reporting for duty in Montana.
Chapter 35 (H.B. 114) authorizes the issuance of wild turkey tags
for a fee of $2.00. The wild turkey is classified by section 26-201 as an
"upland game bird;" tags may be issued to holders of class A (resident
game bird and fishing), class B-1 (nonresident game bird) or class B-2
(nonresident big game) licenses. The Act provides that turkey tags may
be issued by drawing or in unlimited numbers in accordance with Commission regulations.
Section 26-703 is amended by the provisions of Chapter 123 (S.B.
132) to allow nonresidents properly licensed to ship from the state a legal
limit of fish. The section formerly read "one.") In addition, the amendment allows purchase from authorized license dealers of permits for the
shipment of additional fish. The purchase of the permit does not allow
taking more than the legal limit per day. The effect of the amendment
seems to be to allow nonresidents to ship or remove from the state a legal
limit each day so long as he purchases permits therefor. Further amendment of the section adds the words "fur-bearing animals" to the list of
animals, birds or fish for which shipping permits are required.
HIGHWAYS
Chapter 133 of the Laws of 1959 (S.B. 190) amends section 84-1817,
IR.C.M. 1947, as amended, to provide that apportionment of state construction moneys to the federal aid secondary highway system should inhttps://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol20/iss2/9
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elude state owned lands from which the state derives grazing, timber and
agricultural income. In addition, the amendment provides that the value
of rural lands must be computed from the latest Board of Equalization
report. The chief result of these changes is to allow financial districts or
counties with state holdings a share of construction funds equitably related
to the shares of areas in which there are no state owned lands.
1959]

Chapter 134 (Sen. Sub. for S.B. 197) amends Chapter 20 of Title 32,
concerning controlled access highways, and is so short and to the point
COMMERCIAL ENTERas to be worthy of quotation: "32-2009.1.
PRISE OR STRUCTURE-No commercial enterprise or structure can be
constructed or operated on the publicly owned right-of-way of, or on any
publicly owned or leased land used for, or in connection with a controlled
access facility." The language seems broad enough to prohibit anything
from restaurant to billboard, and is a forthright statement on a problem
which has concerned the United States Congress and other legislatures."
By the provisions of Chapter 210 (S.B. 177), the power of the State
Highway Commission to sell property interests not necessary for state
highway purposes is enlarged to include personal property and printed
matter. In addition, the amendment allows the landowner from whom the
real property was originally acquired the option to purchase it from the
Commission for the amount received within ten days from the date the land
is "sold" at public auction. The prior owner is granted a similar remedy
when the Commission seeks to trade what was formerly his land for other
land needed for highway purposes.
Several sections of the Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, are affected
by Chapter 247 of the Laws of Montana 1959 (H.B. 254). Sections 32-103,
32-2114, and 84-1831 change the definition of public roads and highways
to read as follows:

".

.

. all streets, roads, highways, and related struc-

tures as have been, or shall be, built and maintained with appropriated
funds of the United States and which have been, or shall be built and maintained with funds of the State of Montana, or any political subdivision
thereof, or which have been or shall be dedicated to public use or have been
acquired by eminent domain." In addition, two new sections have been
added to 84-1831. One provides that operating motor vehicles "directly
across" public roads and highways for the purpose of transporting natural
resources products (including crops and livestock) is not to be considered
operating such vehicles on the roads or highways. The other restricts the
state's powers to regulate motor vehicles, license them, or to tax the fuel
they use to vehicles "operated on the public roads and highways of this
state."
(Emphasis supplied.)
'For example, New York Public Authorities Law, section 361-a, prohibits erection
of any "advertising device" within 500 feet of the nearest edge of the pavement of
the New York Thruway. "Advertising device" Is defined as any "device intended
to attract or which does attract the attention of operators of motor vehicles on the
thruway ....
'
The concern is at once esthetic, commercial and humane. Prohibitions against billboards and the like are tied to desires to preserve natural
beauty, while those who seek to attract the attention of the traveling public are
not so motivated. Those who have examined Into such matters as "turnpike fatigue" have suggested that the interests of safety might be served by allowing erection of structures along the right-of-way In order to break the monotony of continued high speed driving, and prevent inattention and dozing at the wheel.
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It is the last amendment which gives substance to the others, but
this would not be so clear had one not access to the text of the House bill
as it was presented. Section 1 of that bill declared that, because of increased highway travel casualties and costs to the state, it was the policy
of the state to encourage "the off-highway use of motor vehicles." By
Senate amendment, both this section and the reference thereto in the title
of the bill were deleted. It is not clear whether, or to what extent, there
is conflict between the stated limitation on the state's power to tax fuels,
and the provisions of section 84-1818 concerning the refund of fuel taxes
paid by those who did not use their vehicles on the public highways.
INSURANCE
New Insurance Code
The most extensive piece of legislation passed by the assembly was
the new insurance code, Chapter 286 (H.B. 29), whose effective date was
set ahead to January 1, 1961. The Law Review anticipates publishing an
article in the Spring, 1960, issue treating the new code in detail, so the
statute will not be reviewed here. However, a few of its provisions are
discussed hereinafter under the heading of Uniform and Model Laws.
THE JUDICIARY
Number of Judges and Salaries
Chapter 161 (H.B. 329) provides for another district court judge for
Cascade and Chotueau Counties. It provides for the election in 1960 of a
third judge for the Eighth Judicial District, who is to undertake his duties
the first Monday in January, 1961.
Chapter 198 (H.B. 155) raises the annual salaries of district court
judges from $9000 to $9500.
LABOR LAW
Chapter 160 (H.B. 416), is the only bill regulating the labor-management field, enacted into law. It intends to protect the very small business
man in the retail field in the use of members of his family in his business,
without interference or pressure from unions, by providing that it is an
"unfair labor practice" for a union to "infringe or interfere" with such
right to employ members of the family in a business, and imposing a fine
of $50.00 for any violation of the Act. This bill acquired the sobriquet of
the "Little Right to Work Law."
House Bill 33 proposed to protect persons from ages 45 to 65 against
"discriminatory treatment" of any kind whatsoever as a worker or potential worker, because of his age. This bill was killed. Still another bill,House Bill 20, would have established a minimum wage law at $1.00 per
hour, with further provisions requiring the keeping of certain records
thereon. It too was defeated.
The fragmentary, piece-meal treatment which is given the labormanagement relations field generally, by the bills introduced into the
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol20/iss2/9
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Montana legislature through the past several sessions, strongly suggests
the possible need for a careful study of the whole field to determine whether
a comprehensive integrated code, covering the field should be prepared for
legislative consideration.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
Chapter 195 (H.B. 335) authorizes cities to act to rehabilitate blighted
areas. In the process, they may acquire and dispose of property, issue
bonds, levy taxes and assessments, make agreements to get federal aid,
and create urban renewal agencies. The act emphasizes a purpose that
cities give maximum opportunity to redevelopment by private enterprise.
The act confers broad powers on cities, except that it recites that it shall
not be construed to authorize municipal construction of any electric generation plant or other public utility facilities except water and sewer lines.

PERPETUITIES;PENSION AND PROFIT-SHARING PLANS
Draftsmen of pension and profit-sharing trusts have been bothered by
the question of the applicability of rules against perpetuities or against
suspension of the power of alienation to such trusts. Chapter 214 (S.B.
103) settles this question by providing that no rule relating to restraints
against alienation, suspension of the power of alienation, accumulations of
income, perpetuities or remoteness of vesting shall apply to a trust which
is part of a pension, retirement, insurance, savings, stock bonus, profitsharing plan or similar plan created by an employer, group of employers,
labor union, or an association of employees for the benefit of employees
or their beneficiaries.
This bill should be viewed with Chapter 213 (S.B. 104), which amends
sections 67-406, -407 to change the period for permissible suspension of
the power of alienation and adopts the common law rule against perpetuities. This latter statute is discussed more fully infra under the heading
of Uniform and Model Laws, Model Rule Against PerpetuitiesAct.

PERSONAL PROPERTY
Chapter 143 (H.B. 302), a short amendment intended to avoid some
problems, may have created some. As the Act stands, it provides for the
extension to the joint owners of personal property the same remedy of
partition which has existed in favor of owners of real property. However,
there was inadvertently omitted from the section of the amendment providing for sale of personal property a reference to Title 93 of the Revised
Codes. This commentator is not prepared to say that this is a fatal defect,
but the omission quite obviously offers a problem of construction.'
"The latter day concern with "legal writing" prompts the additional observation
that section 2 connects a plural noun, provision8, and a singular verb, 1a.
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Tuberculosis Commitment
The legislature has provided for the commitment of persons having
communicable tuberculosis to a public sanitarium under cpurt order. The
statute (Chapter 259 (H.B. 93)) permits any board of health in the state,
upon recommendation of a doctor, to apply to the district court for an
order (1) requiring a person suspected of having communicable tuberculosis to submit to examination, or (2) requiring a person determined to
have communicable tuberculosis (and who refuses to go voluntarily) to be
removed to a sanitarium. After summons, hearing and examination of
the witnesses the court may enter either order. If the person refuses to
submit to examination under court order he shall be committed as though
infected, but no persons can be required to submit to any medical treatment against his will after he is committed. Under the statute one may
apply to the district court for release after 180 days on the ground that
lie is no longer a health menace. This latter provision may limit the right
to hearing under the statute, but cannot limit the right to apply for habeas
corpus. All expenses of the proceedings are a charge on the county.
Under Chapter 189 (Sub. H.B. 92) the executive board of the Montana
Tuberculosis Sanitarium can now receive any person as a patient who is
certified by a physician as suffering from tuberculosis. The new law
(probably enacted to conform with Chapter 259, above) alters the old
provision, which permitted acceptance only of patients unable to pay and
who were citizens or residents of the state for a year.
SCHOOLS
Chapter 39 (H.B. 202) simply reduces the age for compulsory school
attendance from eight to seven years, by amending section 75-2901, R.C.M.
1947, to so provide. The age at which a child may work while going to
school, after completing the eighth grade, was changed from fourteen years
to sixteen years in 1955.
Chapter 167 (H.B. 476) amends R.C.M. 1947, section 75-4601, which
authorizes additional members for school boards under certain conditions.
The new bill expressly empowers those additional members "to vote on the
selection of the district superintendent of schools."
Chapter 278 (H.B. 170) amends section 75-4103, R.C.M. 1947, which
previously provided for the selection of six county high school board members only by appointment by the county commissioners, with the county
superintendent an ex officio seventh member. In the opinion of many high
school patrons, appointed high school boards have at times shown an
extraordinary capacity for arbitrary action. This Act changes the preexisting statute so as to authorize a "local option" as to whether the trustees of any county high school should be appointed or elected. They will
continue to be appointed, however, until a majority of the qualified electors
of the "county high school district" vote for an elective board, in an election duly called by the county commissioners for that purpose, in compliance with a request by petition. The petition must be signed by fifteen
percent of the qualified voters of such "county high school district." Any
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twenty-five qualified electors may file nominations with the county clerk
and recorder, with as many names as there are offices to fill, for such
election. The earliest date on which' such an election can be authorized
is the first Saturday in April. At the first election the trustees will choose
one, two and three year terms by lot; thereafter all will hold office for
three years, with an annual election to replace expiring memberships.
Upon election of the seven board members, the county superintendent is no
longer a member. It may be hoped that this bill will provide relief for
those districts in which there is dissatisfaction, without disturbing those
appointed boards which are rendering satisfactory performance.
1959]

STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Constitutional Amendments
House Bills 131 and 137, which would have submitted to the electors
a proposal to hold a convention for the purpose of revising, altering or
amending the Constitution, were killed.
Chapter 193 (H.B. 197) was passed. It provides for the submission
to the electors of an amendment to the Constitution which would increase
from two to four years the time limit upon the terms of office which may
be prescribed by the legislative assembly for county, township, precinct and
municipal officers, except as otherwise provided in the Constitution.
Federal Aid to Education
Senate Joint Resolution 4 petitioned Congress to provide funds through
the proposed "School Support Act of 1959" (sponsored by Senators Murray, Mansfield and others, and introduced by Congressman Lee Metcalf
and others, including Representative LeRoy Anderson), to supplement
state and local financial resources.
Bond Validation
Chapter 16 (H.B. 96) was passed to be in force and effect from and
after its passage and approval, ratifying and confirming bonds and other
instruments and obligations heretofore issued by public bodies of the state.
Meetings of County Commissioners
Chapter 132 (S.B. 31) provides for an extra meeting of boards of
county commissioners. The Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, section 16-910,
provides for meetings on the first Monday of each month. This is amended
to provide for meetings on the first and third Monday of each month, except when the commissioners are meeting as the County Board of Equalization.
Notice of Intention to Create Special Improvement Districts
Chapter 261 (H.B. 437) changes the present requirement of R.C.M.
1947, section 11-2204, that notice of the passing of a resolution of intention of a city council to create a special improvement district be mailed to
all owners of property within the district. This requirement was rigidly
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applied in Wood v. City of Kalispell," which held that failure to mail a
notice to a single property owner, although due only to mistake or inadvertence and not to bad faith, was fatal, since strict compliance with the
statute is jurisdictional. The amendment to the statute makes it less
onerous by providing that the notice need be mailed only to owners of real
property within the district listed in their names upon the last completed
assessment roll for state county and school district taxes.
Planning Boards
The act of the 1957 legislature providing for the creation of city and
city-county planning boards was amended in some particulars. Included
within the changes made by Chapter 271 (H.B. 91) are the following: Two
of the four citizen members of a city planning board must be freeholders
within the urban area, two must be freeholders within the city limits, and
such citizen members must not hold other office in city government. The
citizen members of a city-county planning board are required to be freeholders within the area over which the planning board has jurisdiction,
and two must be freeholders in the area outside the city. The provisions
of the 1957 law with respect to the terms of office of citizen members of
city planning boards are repealed. Approval by the board of county commissioners is required of the map or plot of the unincorporated area over
which the planning board has jurisdiction. Further, boards of county
commissioners are given the powers regarding building and zoning regulations which city councils also have under the 1957 law.' Under the amendment when an unincorporated area is within the potential jurisdiction of
more than one planning board, the boundary between the conflicting areas
is to be settled by agreement between the planning boards involved, with
the approval of their respective governing bodies, rather than by a proportion of the population of the incorporated area as presently provided.
The provisions of the 1957 law respecting the recovery and use of mineral
and forest resources is expanded to include agricultural resources.
Fees for Examination of Credit Unions
Chapter 115 (H.B. 368) changes the fee for examination by the state
examiner of credit unions. The fee is raised to $45.00 a day for each person engaged in the examination, but without charge for transportation or
per diem, whereas the law has provided for a fee of $30.00 per day plus
transportation and per diem.
Methods of Recording Instruments
The methods of recording instruments have been modernized. Chapter
116 (S.B. 39) permits county clerks and recorders to preserve records by
the use of microfilm. Chapter 117 (S.B. 40) provides for the recordation of instruments by photostatic, microphotographic or microfilm process.
131 Mont. 390, 310 P.2d 1058 (1957), noted in Recent Decision, 20 MONT. L. REv.
114 (1958).
'IHouse Bill 90 authorizes county commissioners represented on city-county planning boards to exercise building and zoning powers granted to city councils by
R.C.M. 1947, § 11-2701 to -2709.
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Warehouse Insurance
Chapter 145 (S.B. 173) amends the statute relating to the licensing of
public warehousemen by requiring the carrying of adequate insurance approved by the commissioner of agriculture to protect holders of warehouse
receipts from loss.
Lobbying
Chapter 157 (S.B. 26) seeks "to promote a high standard of ethics in
the practice of lobbying, to prevent unfair and unethical lobbying practices and to provide for the licensing of lobbyists and the suspension or
revocation of such licenses."
The restrictions imposed by the act are effective only during regular or special sessions of the legislature. Lobbying
is defined as "the practice of promoting or opposing the introduction or enactment of legislation before the legislature or members thereof by any
person other than a member of the legislature or a public official acting
in his official capacity." A lobbyist is one who is paid for his services
but persons who are reimbursed only for personal living or travel expenses
or who limit their activities solely to appearances before legislative committees and who register such appearances in writing on the record of the
committee are not subject to the act. Employment of lobbyists on a contingent fee basis is prohibited.
Applications for licenses are filed with the Secretary of State and must
be accompanied by a fee of ten dollars. Only persons of adult age, of good
moral character and citizens of the United States are eligible. Licenses
expire on December 31 of each odd numbered year but may be otherwise
suspended or revoked in a civil action instituted by the Attorney General
1959]

because of "unprofessional conduct or . . . having procured his license by

fraud or perjury or through error." The Secretary of State is required
to maintain a docket of all lobbyists, their principals, and the subjects of
legislation to which their employment relates. Weekly reports of such information are submitted to each house during the legislative session with
such changes as may occur.
Copies of Legislative Proceedings
Chapter 223 (H.B. 544) levies a charge of one hundred dollars for a
complete set of each item of the proceedings of the legislature or 250 per
single copy of all bills and similar items and 10¢ per copy for status sheets.
All elected state officials, state department heads and county clerks and
recorders are exempt from the provisions of the act and "representatives
of the press, radio, and television who shall have first registered with the
Secretary of State" are entitled to receive one complete set of the mimeographed and printed proceedings without charge.
Council of State Governments; Interstate Cooperation
Chapter 72 (H.B. 519) may have greater implications than any other
single enactment of the 1959 session. That act authorizes Montana to
become a member of the Council of State Governments and provides that
the Legislative Council shall be a member of the Commission on Interstate
Cooperation. Although Montana has been represented on the National Conference on Uniform Laws for many years, recommendations of the Montana
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Commissioners to the legislature have been disregarded in many instances.
(See the discussion infra under the heading of Uniform and Model Laws.)
However it is now the stated policy to:
Endeavor to advance cooperation between this state and other
units of government whenever it seems advisable to do so by formulating proposals for interstate compacts and reciprocal or uniform
legislation, and by facilitating the adoption of uniform or reciprocal administrative rules or regulations, informal cooperation
of governmental offices, personal cooperation among government
officials and employees, interchange and clearance of research and
information, and any other suitable process.
The implementation of this policy is a matter for the future but the
mechanics and the stimulus have been provided whereby Montana can
profitably emulate and incorporate the experience of her sister states.
TAXATION
Automobile Tax
Chapter 103 (S.B. 166) which amends section 53-617, R.C.M. 1947,
apparently was intended to provide for imposition of a sales (or use)
tax on new cars, based on their port of entry list price rather than their
factory list price. It is doubtful, however, that the bill has achieved this
result, since it provides for a tax of a given per cent of the factory list price
or port of entry list price, with no statement that the higher price is to be
used or that, in the case of imported cars, the port of entry list price is to
be used. The tax is applicable only to vehicles for which a Montana license
is sought.
Corporation License Tax
Chapter 263 (H.B. 307) relates to deductions allowed in computing
corporation license tax net income. It adds language to R.C.M. 1947, section
84-1502 to permit the computation of deductions on the accrual method of
accounting. It disallows the deduction of salaries on which the recipient
has not paid the Montana income tax, subject to a provision that salaries
paid in securing income derived from outside the state are deductible if the
corporation is taxed on that income. The bill also changes the language
relating to the deduction of taxes; the only substantive change in that
respect seems to be a disallowance of federal taxes on or measured by net
income or profits.
Income Tax
Non-Resident Officers of CorporationsDoing Business in State;
Partnerships
Chapter 253 (H.B. 460), effective for years ending after June 30,
1959, amends R.C.M. 1947, section 84-4903 to provide for taxing salaries,
fees, and other compensation paid to a non-resident officer or director of
a corporation doing business in this state, to the extent that the compensation is deducted in computing the Montaha corporation license tax. Whether
the officer or director performs services within Montana is immaterial.
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This bill adds a provision to the effect that, if a taxpayer's status
changes from resident to non-resident or vice versa during a year, his
exemptions are to be prorated in the proportion that his Montana adjusted
gross income bears to his federal adjusted gross income.
The bill amends R.C.M. 1947, section 84-4911 to require that partners
furnish copies of their federal partnership returns.
Non-Residents Receiving Payments from Montana Residents or
Organizations
Chapter 208 (S.B. 105) provides for withholding of the Montana income tax from payments made by persons or organizations within Montana
to non-residents for services performed in Montana, casual sales of property located in Montana, for leases, rentals or royalties from property
located in Montana, or for prizes or winnings from or within Montana.
An exception is made for payments for livestock or farm products raised
or grown outside Montana and sold at a market within Montana.
Personal
Chapter 265 (H.B. 315) was intended to amend R.C.M. 1947, section
84-4902 so as to produce increased revenue by raising the rates of the
personal income tax. The increases were to be as follows:
On the second one thousand dollars of taxable income, from 11/2%
to 2%.
On the third one thousand dollars of taxable income, from 2% to 3%.
On the fourth and fifth thousand dollars of taxable income, from 22%
and 3% to 4%.
On the sixth and seventh thousand dollars of taxable income, from
31/1% and 4% to 5%.
On taxable income in excess of seven thousand dollars, from 5% to 7%.
The provision for the effective date of the act however, states: "This
act shall be in full force and effect from and after December 31, 1959."
This seems to mean that the new rates cannot take effect until 1960. Apparently the legislature assumed that the new rates would apply to 1959 income, but a court probably would construe this act as not so applicable.
This would follow from the plain meaning rule, under which a court will
interpret a statute according to the plain meaning of its words. There
have been cases in which courts have rejected the plain meaning rule and
have refused to apply the language of a statute literally, on the ground that
a literal application would lead to an absurd result or on the ground that
the statute incorporated a clerical error which the court could correct.
Here a literal application would not produce an absurd result; a legislature might well have intended to delay application of an increase in rates.
Something similar to a clerical error seems, however, to have occurred. For
material relating to the possibility of judicial correction of this apparent
error, see 50 American Jurisprudence Statutes, section 232 (1944).
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1958

31

REVIEW
MONTANA
Montana Law
Review, Vol.LAW
20 [1958],
Iss. 2, Art. 9

[Vol. 20,

Inheritance Tax
Chapter 232 (S.B. 72), which amends R.C.M. 1947, section 91-4407
relating to the inheritance tax, provides for the deduction of attorneys'
fees, filing fees, necessary expenses and closing costs incident to proceedings
to terminate joint tenancies, termination of life estates and transfers in
contemplation of death, and any and all other proceedings instituted for the
determination of the inheritance tax. This is in addition to the deductions
previously allowed.
TORTS
Liability of the State
The defense of sovereign immunity to suit in tort has been partially
waived by the state in Chapter 254 (H.B. 237). The new law gives the
district courts exclusive jurisdiction to permit recovery against the state
for property damage or personal injury resulting from the negligence or
other wrong of any state employee acting within the scope of his employment, in circumstances where a private individual would be liable. The
recovery is limited, however, to the extent of the insurance coverage
carried by the state, and there may be no punitive damages assessed against
the state. Litigation is under the control of the Attorney General, though
he cannot settle any suit without the consent of the Board of Examiners
and the court where the suit is pending.
Beyond the limits of insurance carried by the state, direct appropriation is still the only remedy. One such appropriation measure (H.B. 55)
awarded $81,000 to a boy who had been blinded as a result of negligence on
the part of state employees.
Other Proposals
Three other measures of interest in the area of tort law were killedthe Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act (H.B. 291); a
proposal substituting the rule of comparative negligence for the defense
of contributory negligence (H.B. 384) ; and a bill permitting direct action
against an automobile insurer who has a stake in the outcome of a lawsuit,
or permitting joining him as a party. (H.B. 283).
UNIFORM AND MODEL LAWS
Acceptance of recommended legislation in the form of Model or Uniform Acts has been cyclic in Montana. The 1959 legislative session enacted six such proposals but killed or failed to act upon four others. The
American Bar Association at a mid-year meeting in Chicago in February,
1959, called upon state and local bar associations to assist in securing the
enactment of such legislation to the end that greater uniformity in the
laws of the various states would be achieved. Montana has enacted approximately one-third of the acts promulgated and currently recommended
by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Seven other
acts originally promulgated by the Conference but now superseded or withdrawn, are still in effect in Montana. In some instances, the 1959 enactments do not contain the most recent amendments or additions promulgated
by the Conference. Closer liaison between the proponents of such meashttps://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol20/iss2/9
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ures and the Montana Commissioners on Uniform State Laws is necessary
if such omissions are to be avoided. Greater support from groups affected is necessary if recommended model and uniform legislation is to be
enacted.
Uniform Acts Enacted by Montana in 1959
Facsimile Signatures of Public Officials Act
Chapter 260 (H.B. 290) permits the use of facsimile signatures and
seals on public securities and instruments of payment issued by the state
or any of its instrumentalities or political subdivisions. It will dispense
with the necessity of travel to New York City by officials to sign bonds
manually. At least one manual signature is required on securities, and all
signatures as to which facsimiles are. authorized must first be registered.
Under the Uniform Act as promulgated by the National Conference in 1958
all such registrations are filed with one designated state official; the act
as adopted by Montana provides that signatures of state officers are registered with the Secretary of State and signatures of officers of political subdivisions are registered with the clerk of the subdivision.
Principaland Income Act
As promulgated by the National Conference in 1931 this Act provides
for ascertainment of income and principal, and apportionment of receipts
and expenses, as between tenants and remaindermen in trust and other
estates in property. It operates except where the settlor has made other
provisions. As to dividends on corporate stock, it follows the Massachusetts
rule of awarding cash dividends to income and share dividends to principal. It provides separate rules'for apportionment of unproductive property, property used in business, animals and natural resources. By 1958
this act had been adopted in 22 states.
The National Conference in 1958 amended the act by adding a section
concerning probate income received by an executor and delivered by him
to the trustee of a testamentary trust or to another legatee. Chapter 277
(H.B. 231) by which Montana adopted the act in 1959 did not include the
1958 amendment.
Insurers Liquidation Act
This Act, promulgated by the National Conference in 1939, had been
adopted by 16 states by 1958. It is a reciprocal statute providing for
liquidation, rehabilitation, and reorganization of insurance companies whose
business and assets are in more than one state. It is included in the new
insurance code enacted by Montana effective January 1, 1961 (Sections
566, 579-85, Chapter 286, H.B. 29). However, the Montana adoption intersperses with the various provisions of the Uniform Act provisions relating to liquidation of domestic companies.
Section 3 of FiduciariesAct
Section 3 of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act of 1922 limits the liability
of an issuer, in transfers of securities by fiduciaries, to cases where the
issuer has actual knowledge of a breach of fiduciary duty or where the
action amounts to bad faith. This section was superseded in 1958 by proPublished by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1958
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mulgation of the Uniform Simplification of Fiduciary Security Transfers
Act, because the Commissioners found that transfer agents refused to rely
on section 3 in view of the duty of inquiry imposed on issuers by the 1953
edition of the Uniform Commercial Code. The UCC defined "notice" for
such purpose as including both "actual knowledge" and "reason to know."
The 1958 act was therefore designed to limit the concepts of "knowledge"
and "notice" for purposes of fiduciary security transfers, so as to eliminate
burdensome documentation required by transfer agents. Montana, however, enacted in 1959 a statute the principal section of which is substantially
the same as the superseded section 3 of the Fiduciaries Act. See Chapter
136, (H.B. 469). The Montana enactment, like those of Indiana and Pennsylvania, covers registration as well as transfer and expands the definition
of "fiduciary" to include also nominees.

Other Acts Recommended by the National Conference for
Adoption Where Need Exists, Enacted by Montana in 1959
Model Rule Against PerpetuitiesAct
The Model Act as promulgated by the National Conference in 1944
adopts the common-law rule against perpetuities. Chapter 213 (S.B. 104)
included this provision, amended the existing statutory rule against
suspension of the absolute power of alienation to prescribe the same period,
and added a provision that, for inter vivos revocable trusts, the periods
under both rules begin to run at the date of the trustor's death. In general
the Montana statute follows a California statute enacted in 1951. Montana also enacted in 1959 a statute excluding from both rules pension and
other employees' trusts. See Chapter 214 (S.B. 103), which is discussed
more fully under the heading Perpetuities; Pension and Profit-Sharing
Plans.
Uniform Unauthorized Insurers Act
This act, promulgated by the Commissioners in 1938, prohibits specified activities by or for insurers not authorized to transact business in
the state, and prohibits institution of actions by unauthorized insurers.
It provides for service of process in the state on unauthorized insurers, and
requires them, before proceeding to defend in actions brought against
them, to furnish bond or obtain a certificate of authority. By 1958 this
act, or substantially similar legislation, had been adopted in 8 states, and
a number of other states had enacted very similar legislation.
The new insurance code enacted by Montana effective January 1, 1961,
contains a substantial adoption of the Uniform Act (Sections 176-83, Chapter 286, H.B. 29) although it varies in some details and uses the short title,
"Unauthorized Insurers Process Act" (which has been used in several
other states) rather than the short title promulgated by the National Conference. The Montana act includes a pr'ovision not in the Uniform Act, for
allowance of attorneys' fees in actions against unauthorized insurers for
vexatious refusal to make payment in accordance with contract.
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Model State Administrative Procedure Act (with additions). S.B. 179.
Died in Senate Committee.
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, as revised 1958. S.B.
201. Passed Senate but was killed by adverse House Committee report.
Uniform ContributionAmong Tortfeasors Act. H.B. 291. Died in House
Committee.
Uniform Securities Act (substantial adoption). H.B. 145. Passed House
but was killed in Senate.
An appropriation to pay Montana's pro rata share of the expense of
the National Conference was requested but failed. It is questionable
whether Montana should continue to participate in the Conference unless
this responsibility is discharged.
The submission of recommended legislation is not merely a matter of
deciding what model or uniform acts are feasible. A detailed check of
existing statutes and the resolution of policy matters must be effected in
the case of each proposed act. Amendments or repeal of existing statutory
provisions may be required depending upon the consideration given to
that particular area of the law by previous legislatures. As a consequence,
one of the model acts recommended to the 1959 legislature, which failed to
pass, required in excess of one thousand hours to prepare for submission.
Improvement in Montana law, as well as achieving uniformity with
the laws of other states where that is desirable, demands more study and
accommodation of model and uniform acts to the needs of the state.
WILLS
Can a testator incorporate by reference an inter vivos trust, particularly if that trust is revocable or amendable? If so, does his will create a
testamentary trust? Chapter 185 (H.B. 430) settles these questions by
providing that a testator may make a devise or bequest to the trustee of
an inter vivos trust already or concurrently created by him, although the
trust is revocable or amendable and even though the trust is in fact amended after the execution of the will. The bill further provides that unless the
testator provides otherwise the property devised or bequeathed shall become
part of the inter vivos trust, administered according to the terms of that
trust, including any amendments.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Industrial Accident Board
In 1953 the Commissioner of Agriculture replaced the State Auditor as
a member of the Industrial Accident Board; by Chapter 231 (S.B. 168)
he is in turn supplanted by the director of the Bureau of Vocational Rehabilitation.
Hernia
The special provision for hernia cases in R.C.M. 1947, section 92-710,
is repealed by Chapter 197 (H.B. 370). Hernia cases will now be governed by the general rules, which will likely prove to be more liberal in
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operation than the special provision was. A hernia under most circumstances can properly be considered an industrial accident, even though it
does not meet all the requirements of the repealed section.
Benefits
The legislature passed Substitute House Bill 333, which provided for
substantially increased benefits, but the bill was vetoed by the Governor.
it would have raised maximum compensation for temporary total disability
from $42.50 to $57.50 per week, though it would have raised maximum
compensation for partial disability, for permanent total disability or for
death only from $42.50 to $44.50. The compensation period for scheduled
injuries would on the whole have been markedly increased-in some cases
more than doubled. And of incidental interest is the adoption in the bill
of more technical terminolgy for the scheduled injuries. The waiting period
before compensation becomes payable would have been shortened from a
week to five days. The rules for increasing the number of dependents
would have been liberalized. The Governor's veto message indicated that
his principal objection was to the provision that despite the increased
benefits there should be no increase in premiums unless the total claims
paid out in any year should exceed 80 per cent of the total premiums
collected in the previous year. This, the Governor thought, would tend to
deplete the existing reserve fund before premiums could catch up with
increased expenditures. Though vetoed, this bill indicates the shape of
things to come.
Free Transcript
Chapter 170 (H.B. 402) requires the board to furnish to the
without cost a copy of the record made in a hearing. This copy,
can apparently be demanded only after an action to review an
decision of the board has been commenced, not in preparation
mencement of such action.

claimant
however,
order or
for com-

Assessment of Insurers
Assessment of insurers who operate under Plan 2 was nearly doubled.
In the last legislature the assessment was changed from a flat $3 per policy
to 134/ per cent of the gross annual direct premiums (less return premiums)
collected in Montana by the insurer. By Chapter 203 (S.B. 189) the assessment is increased to 314 per cent. The money assessed is available for
payment of the costs of administering the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Occupational Disease
Perhaps the most significant legislation in the workmen's compensation field since the enactment of the original statute is the adoption of an
occupational disease bill-Chapter 155 (S.B. 112).'
The principle of
workmen's compensation is extended thereby beyond industrial accident,
1°This bill was adopted over two other proposals in the same session. House Bill
396 would have created a Special Disability Fund, similar to the Second-Injury
Fund now existing under R.C.M. 1947, § 92-709A, and swallowing up the latter
fund. Substitute House Bill 397 would have made silicosis, as such, compensable
and would have divided liability to pay the award among all employers in whose
employ the workman was exposed to silica dust.
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with its requirement of a "fortuitous event" or sudden injury, to the
whole realm of occupational disease.
The statute is entitled "The Occupational Disease Act of Montana,"
but we shall refer to it here simply as the act. It is comprised of seventy
sections, one third the size of the entire Workmen's Compensation Act, and
unnecessarily long. Though in form separate from the Workmen's Compensation Act, it is in essence only an extension of the scope of liability
under that act. Dozens of sections are copied unchanged from the Workmen's Compensation Act, and much else is adopted by general or specific
reference to the parent act. For example, of twenty-eight definitions some
twenty are copied, even though there is also a general adoption of workmen's compensation definitions. Likewise, chapters nine and ten of the
Workmen's Compensation Act are reproduced almost verbatim, and the
same is true of numerous procedural sections, even after a general adoption of practice and procedure from workmen's compensation.' Because
of the general similarity between the two acts, mention will be made only
of the more important new provisions.
The terms disability and disablement are used throughout to mean total
incapacitation to work, whether temporary or permanent. There is no
compensation under the act for partialincapacitation. Occupationaldisease
within the meaning of the act includes only silicosis; poisoning by eighteen
named chemical substances and by tamarack; X-ray or radioactive poisoning; and anthrax. A claim will be honored if one of these diseases follows
as a natural and proximate result of exposure to a hazard characteristic
of the employer's business.
Only the last employer in whose service the claimant was "injuriously
exposed" to the hazard of disease (at least in part after the effective date
of the act) is liable when the employee becomes totally incapacitated, and
then only if disability results within 120 days of the termination of employment (or within one year in the Board's discretion). There is a special
rule for silicosis: Only the last employer in whose employ the claimant
was exposed to harmful quantities of silica dust for ninety workshifts
after July 1, 1958, and for some period after the effective date of the act,
is liable, and then only if within eight years before disablement the employee was exposed to harmful quantities of dust for 1000 shifts in Montana
and if disablement follows within four years of termination of employment
by the employer to be charged. If the employer should discharge a silicotic
in order to avoid liability under the foregoing rule, he will still be liable
if the claimant was employed by him 700 shifts since January 1, 1954. And
if the employer ever discharges an employee who has an occupational disease which is not yet disabling (or when the employee quits to avoid aggravation of the disease) the IAB has discretion to make such award as it
deems just, up to $5000.
Claims for death will be honored beyond the one or four year periods
mentioned above, provided the death results during a period of continuous
disability resulting from the disease.
"There is also the problem of indiscriminate copying. For example, R.C.M. 1947,
§§ 92-411 and -436, with their ambiguity concerning casual employment, were copied
unchanged, and section 47 of the Act is duplicated in section 54.
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The time of filing claims for disablement or death is counted from the
date the claimant knew or should have known the nature of the disease
and its connection with his employment, with a limit of thirteen months
(or forty-nine months for disablement, but not death, by silicosis) from
the last day of employment by the employer claimed against.
To examine claimants for silicosis, the Board is to appoint at least
three lung specialists, and to examine other claimants it is to appoint at least
thirty other physicians. Examination of the claimants is compulsory and
the report of the examination is submitted to the Board. On the basis
of the report (and apparently on the basis of permissive cross-examination
of the lung specialist) the Board makes its determination. Any interested
party may demand a hearing or may choose to demand a second medical
examination. If the latter is chosen the evidence of the two examinations
together is final and no evidence of other examinations may thereafter be
admitted before the Board or in court.
Lump sum payments to the claimant are flatly prohibited, but the
Board may order the paying agency to pay the claimant's attorney in a
lump and to deduct a proportionate amount from the claimant's regular
compensation check.
Hospital expenses are, as in workmen's compensation, subject to an
initial limit of $2500, but not, as there, to a limit of thirty-six months. Persons only partially disabled by occupational disease receive no compensation, but they are entitled to $1000 medical expenses.
Where an occupational disease and some non-compensable cause join
to disable an employee, he may receive proportional compensation. Silicosis
complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis is presumptively disabling and, if
disablement is found, it is fully compensable.
The original bill included provision permitting an employer to require a waiver from new employees of any claim for aggravation of existing occupational disease. In its final form the statute permits the employer
to require physical examination of both employees and applicants for employment and provides that "such employer shall not be liable under this
act for disability from the particular disease or diseases with which the
employee is found to be afflicted or for any normal progression without
aggravation of said disease or diseases." This appears to make the employer liable only if he causes aggravation of existing disease.
Rights to suit at common law are technically available for those employees ineligible for compensation or who elect not to be covered by the
act (though it is compulsory for employers), but recovery is difficult
and the statute of limitations frequently a problem, especially for silicosis.
For silicotics without possibility of recovery at common law or under the
act, there is still available the special provision for public welfare benefits."
The employer has a special defense to the claim of an employee who
knowingly and falsely represents in writing at the time of employment
that he had not before been disabled, laid off or compensated for the same
occupational disease.
" Chapter 248 (H.B. 50) increased these benefits from $65 to $75 per month, but even
they are limited to residents of ten years who are not gainfully employed and with
income under $150 per month.
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